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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant proposes the following issues as those primarily raised in this 
appeal: 
1. Abuse of judicial discretion in that the sentencing judge did not following 
the sentencing guidelines, made no findings relative to his decision not to follow the guidelines, 
and the sentence is therefore arbitrary and capricious, subjecting the Defendant to a lack of 
uniform operation of the law. 
2. The Appellant's knowledge of the co-Defendant's sentence influenced his 
plea, created an atmosphere of false security and sureness as to the outcome, and removed it from 
the category of "knowing" and 'voluntary." 
3. The Appellant is entitled to the benefit of his plea bargain. 
4. The sentencing judge did not comply fully with Rule 11, governing the 
acceptance of pleas. 
5. The judge's pique at both the prosecuting and defense attorneys led him to 
use personal discretion, rather than judicial discretion, in sentencing the Defendant/Appellant, 
constituting a further abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case, the Defendant/Appellant is an eighteen-year-old youth who was 
charged in District Court with two counts of theft (second-degree felony), two counts of criminal 
mischief (third-degree felony), one count of burglary of a vehicle (Class A misdemeanor), one 
count of theft (Class A misdemeanor), and one count of theft (Class B misdemeanor). The 
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charges stem mainly from two incidents in which the Defendant/Appellant, in company with a 
twenty-year-old co-defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Co-defendant Black") and three 
juveniles. 
These charges had been brought subsequent to a previous case filed in the 
Juvenile Court of Tooele County, in which the Appellant pled guilty to forgery. The transcript of 
the Juvenile Court proceedings of October 28,1994, reflects the parties' understanding that the 
State and the Defendant had agreed that a diagnostic evaluation of the Appellant should be 
performed, and that sentencing and further disposition were deferred to the adult court (Juvenile 
Court Transcript, p. 3,11. 16-17). 
The Appellant's co-defendant in the offenses alleged by the State was one Jason 
John Black, a twenty-year-old man with juvenile and adult police records similar to those of the 
Appellant. Though these two young men had similar prior records and were charged with the 
same offenses, Mr. Black was placed on thirty-six months probation and was sentenced to serve 
only 120 days in the Tooele County Jail, with credit given for time served. 
Co-defendant Black was sentenced on October 14, 1994, receiving one- to fifteen-
and zero- to five-year terms, suspended upon service of 120 days in the county jail, restitution, 
200 hours of community service, and three years of probation. 
During arraignment of the Appellant in District Court on November 3, 1994, the 
State again indicated that the Appellant was pleading as charged on Counts I and IV, and the 
prosecutor specifically requested that the Appellant submit to a ninety-day evaluation 
(Transcript, p. 10,1. 8.) 
2 
At the sentencing hearing for the Appellant, the State refused to make the 
recommendation or request that the Appellant submit to the ninety-day evaluation. The 
sentencing judge evidenced anger towards both counsel for their disagreement concerning the 
terms of the plea bargain. The Appellant was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms in the 
Utah State Prison and was immediately taken into custody and transported to the prison. 
It is from these facts and circumstances that this appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Appellant entered into a plea bargain 
agreement in good faith. The plea bargain agreement was frustrated by two sets of 
circumstances: (1) the failure of the prosecution to remember the terms and conditions of the 
plea-bargain agreement at the time of sentencing, which led to the prosecution's failure to abide 
by its commitments under the plea-bargain agreement; and (2) the failure of the judge to 
investigate, without bias and without emotion, the allegation of the prosecution's failure to abide 
by the terms and conditions of the plea-bargain agreement, but instead, engaging in a reckless 
diatribe, resulting in the frustration of the prosecution and defense counsel and the unjust and 
excessively harsh sentencing of the Defendant/Appellant. 
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POINT I 
THERE WAS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THAT THE 
SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT FOLLOW THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 
MADE NO FINDINGS RELATIVE TO HIS DECISION NOT TO FOLLOW THE 
GUIDELINES, AND THE SENTENCE IS THEREFORE ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS, SUBJECTING THE DEFENDANT TO A LACK OF UNIFORM 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-1-104, states: 
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these general 
purposes. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses.... 
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of 
offenses. 
To this end the Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice was statutorily 
created by the Legislature in 1983, with the assignment "to develop, monitor and evaluate 
sentencing and release guidelines for adults and juveniles;.. . ." Guidelines were designed in an 
attempt to structure decision making relative to sentencing and release, with the underlying 
philosophy that "criminal sentences should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense for 
which the offender is convicted." The Guidelines were not promulgated to "eliminate discretion, 
but to bridle it," and to eliminate "unwarranted disparity." (Code of Judicial Administration, 
Appendix D.) 
The Guidelines were intended to make the charging and plea-bargaining system 
honest "by making explicit the sentence an offender with a given background is likely to get." 
Id. Recommendations conforming to the guidelines are to be included in the presentence 
investigation report presented to a sentencing judge, and: 
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Judges should sentence within the guidelines unless they find compelling aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances that would justify departure from the guidelines. These 
circumstances should be stated in open court and included in the record. 
(Id. Italics added.) These guidelines were adhered to with Josh St. Clair until the time of actual 
sentencing. Adult Probation and Parole conducted its investigation and rated the Appellant a "4" 
(0-3 being "excellent"; 4-7, "good"; 8-11 "moderate"; 12-15 "fair"; and 16-28, "poor"). On the 
"General Disposition Matrix of the guidelines, correlating the category "good" with the severity 
of the Appellant's crimes placed him well within the recommended disposition of probation. 
(The presentence reports for this Appellant and for Co-defendant Black are included in the 
Addendum hereto.) 
On the form for "Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances," AP&P marked 
three aggravating factors and two mitigating, for the Appellant. A third probably should also 
have been marked for the Appellant as it was for Co-defendant Black: "Restitution would be 
severely compromised by incarceration." 
In exchange for guilty pleas to the same charges, the State dismissed two felony 
counts and three misdemeanor counts against each defendant. The two defendants had 
comparable juvenile and adult police records, and were charged with the same offenses leading 
from the same incidents. At the time of sentencing, Defendant Black received two concurrent 
prison terms, suspended as stated above. The Appellant received two concurrent prison terms 
and a fine, and was immediately transported to the Utah State Prison. Defendant Black (the older 
of the two-twenty years at the time of the incident) received the minimum imposition of 
sentence under the sentencing guidelines and Defendant/Appellant St. Clair (barely eighteen 
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years of age) received the maximum imposition of sentence, though both co-defendants were 
charged with the same offenses and both had similar prior histories. 
Section 24, Article I , of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation." The Courts have affirmed that "all laws shall 
operate uniformly," State v. Holtgreve. 58 Utah 563, 200 P.894, 26 A.L.R. 696 (1921); and that 
the "law must apply equally to all persons within a class," Greenwood v. City of North Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991). These two defendants were "within a class" of similar 
persons, having each pled guilty to identical offenses, having similar recommendations under the 
Guidelines established by the State, but were sentenced differently. The Utah Supreme Court has 
affirmed that "Equal protection of the law provisions do not preclude people from being treated 
differently under the law as long as there is a reasonable basis for the difference" fState v. 
Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986), which implicitly mandates that the reasonable basis for the 
difference be set forth as a finding. In the instant case, no such finding was made and, indeed, 
there is no evidence on the record that it was even contemplated by the court, though it obviously 
should have been. In State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990), the supreme court held that an 
"abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently 
unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive' sentence." Such a disparity is present here, 
where inherently unfair sentencing constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion and a denial 
of the Appellant's constitutional rights under Article I, Section 24. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE WAS SO INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THE CO-DEFENDANT BLACK, WITHOUT 
MATERIAL DIFFERENCES IN THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES, AS TO 
MAKE THE SENTENCE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND ALSO 
CONSTITUTING A LACK OF UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE LAW. 
The law was not uniformly applied to the Appellant at the time of his sentencing. 
With no material differences in the circumstances of the Appellant and Co-defendant Black, the 
sentences received by each were so disparate that the sentencing of the Appellant, which 
occurred later in the sequence of events than the sentencing of Co-defendant Black, can only be 
considered arbitrary and capricious, and therefore subject to being overturned by a court of 
review. In Malanv. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984), Article I, Section 24, of the Utah 
Constitution was quoted, along with the principal that "persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." The Appellant is entitled, if he has the same kinds of 
circumstances, to the same net result, unless there are exigencies that distinguish him from his 
Co-defendant. There do not appear to be distinguishing characteristics between these persons. 
For purposes of evidencing to the Court the character of the similarity of the parties, would the 
Court please refer to the following capsulization of the presentence reports: 
Characteristic Jason Black Joshua St. Clair 
Age 20 18 
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Bargain State dismissed two counts of 
theft, 2° felonies; two counts of 
vehicle burglary, CI. A 
misdemeanors; one count of 
theft, CI. B misdemeanor 
State dismissed one count of 
theft, 2° felonies; one count of 
criminal mischief, 3° felony; 
one count of vehicle burglary, 
CI. A misdemeanor; one count 
Theft CI. A misdemeanor; one 
count of theft, CI. B 
misdemeanor 
Offenses Theft, 2° felony; criminal 
mischief, 3° felony 
Theft, 2° felony; criminal 
mischief, 3° felony 
Record Seven juvenile offenses; this 
adult offense 
Thirty-four juvenile offenses; 
this adult offense 
Agency recom-
mendation 
(1) 120 days in jail w/credit for 
time served; (2) restitution; (3) 
recoupment fee; (4) substance 
abuse evaluation; (5) no alcohol 
use while on probation; (6) no 
frequenting of bars or liquor 
stores; (7) 200 hours 
community service 
(1) 120 days in jail w/credit for 
time served; (2) restitution; (3) 
recoupment fee; (4) substance 
abuse evaluation; (5) no alcohol 
use while on probation; (6) no 
frequenting of bars or liquor 
stores; (7) 200 hours 
community service; (8) commit 
no further crimes 
Total placement 
score 









Property loss extensive; 
multiple charges 
Repetitive criminal conduct; 




Young; assisted law 
enforcement officers; restitution 
would be compromised 
Young; assisted law 
enforcement officers; [should 
also have marked "restitution 
would be compromised"] 
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With the lack of material disparities between the parties, but given the harsh sentence hand out to 
one and the comparatively mild sentence received by the other, one can only conclude that there 
was a lack of uniform application of the law as it applied to these two defendants. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S 
SENTENCE INFLUENCED HIS PLEA, CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE 
OF FALSE SECURITY AND SURENESS AS TO THE OUTCOME, AND 
REMOVED IT FROM THE CATEGORY OF "KNOWING" AND 
"VOLUNTARY." 
Appellant, knowing that he had the same recommendation from Adult Probation 
and Parole as did Co-defendant Black, knowing that the prosecution concurred in the 
recommendation, knowing that Co-defendant Black (two years older than he) had been given a 
suspended sentence wherein he served only 120 days in jail, was ordered to pay restitution, and 
was placed on three years probation, circumstances were created in Defendant's mind where he 
had every expectation of receiving like treatment. 
Despite perhaps having an intellectual understanding that the sentencing judge 
was not bound by the recommendations of AP&P and the prosecutor, the Appellant had a belief 
that he would be treated in like manner. In such a circumstance he cannot truly be said to have 
made his decision freely. His age would have led him to rely on the judgment of his counsel. 
His emotional state would have been one of fear but hope because of the recommendations. He 
received outside assurance from the knowledge that Co-defendant Black received probation. He 
had twice heard the prosecutor state in open court that the State would request a ninety-day 
diagnostic evaluation before he would be sentenced. He had signed a statement in which the 
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State acknowledged requesting a sixty-day evaluation before he would be sentenced. His 
expectations were that he would receive a similar sentence as Co-defendant Black, and any 
reasonable person in the same position would have had the same expectations. Could the plea 
truly then be "knowingly and voluntarily made, without undue influence?" 
The appellate courts of this state have found that for a sentence to be upheld, "full 
knowledge and understanding of the consequences are required" f State v. Miller. 718 P.2D 403 
(Utah 1986)). The decision to enter into a plea bargain must be made "without any undue 
influence, coercion, or improper inducement" State v. Forsyth. 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977). The 
acceptance of confessions has been determined by the tests of whether or not they were the result 
of a "free and unconstrained choice," and that they be "'freely self-determined,' or the product of 
'rational intellect and free will'" (United States v. Gordon. 638 F. Supp. 1120, 1144 (W.D. La. 
1986), as cited in State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989)). Since a plea of guilty amounts to a 
confession, the same standards must apply, requiring the court to consider "the totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L. 
Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973); State v. Hegelman. 717 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986); State v. Moore. 697 
P.2d 233 (Utah 1985), as cited in Strain, supra. 
The circumstances existing in the Defendant/Appellant's mind at the time of final 
sentencing were such that he cannot be deemed to have made his plea knowingly, voluntarily, 
without coercion and undue pressures. 
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POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE 
BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN 
The State's counsel proffered in two different courts, upon the record, that he was 
requesting a diagnostic evaluation to be performed of the Defendant/Appellant (see Transcript of 
juvenile court hearing of 10/28/94, p. 3,11. 16-17; transcript of hearing of 11/3/94, p. 3,11. 11-
12), and received a statement that was referred to in the hearing of 11/3/94 that stated, "The State 
has also agreed to recommend that I be referred to the diagnostic unit of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections for a sixty (60) day diagnostic evaluation before lam sentenced' 
(Statement of the Defendant, p. 5, f 13; italics added), but at the time of sentencing, the State 
reneged and failed to make such a request. 
Regardless of whether or not the sentencing judge is bound by the terms of a plea 
bargain, the Defendant had been influenced by the State's avowal that a request for evaluation 
would be made, and that influence could well be construed as a determining factor in the 
Defendant/Appellant's decision to accept the plea bargain. The prosecutor must be bound by the 
terms of the plea bargain and must make the request as he had previously agreed. The Appellant 
has a constitutional right to remedy when a plea agreement is broken, since a plea agreement 
based upon a promise which is later broken is considered to have been coerced and is therefore 
void. State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). The promise created a false inducement to 
the Defendant to accept the plea bargain, to his detriment. 
This Court has previously held that: 
The Supreme Court has indicated that "when a plea rests in any significant degree 
on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
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inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobellov. New York. 
404 U.S. 257,262, 92 S. Ct. 495,499(1971). The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
recognized Santobello. finding that a criminal defendant who had entered into a plea 
bargain was entitled to have his sentence set aside and to be resentenced with the benefit 
of his bargain when it was not clear from the record that the county attorney's 
recommendation for probation had been included in the presence report presented to the 
sentencing judge. State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). 
State v. Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, in State v. Copeland. 765 
P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988): 
It is well established that a prosecutor may not make promises which induce a 
guilty plea and then refuse to keep those promises. "[A] constant factor is that when a 
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement... such promise must be 
fulfilled." Santobellov. New York. 404 U.S. 275, 262 (1971).... 
Utah has followed the Santobello precedent. In State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129 
(Utah 1976), the prosecutor promised to recommend probation to the sentencing judge... 
. We held that if it had no been included, the defendant was "entitled to have his sentence 
set aside and to be resentenced with the benefit of his bargain." Id., at 130. 
It is clear from the three occurrences in the record that the Defendant/Appellant 
had received the promise that the State would request a diagnostic evaluation before sentence 
would be pronounced. Whether that evaluation was to take sixty or ninety days, it was promised, 
but the promise was not fulfilled. It seems incomprehensible that the prosecutor would state that 
he had "nothing in his notes" concerning the promise when the Statement of the Defendant 
(prepared by the Prosecutor's office) contained a prominent reference to the promise, but such 
was the statement by the State at the sentencing hearing of January 12,1995 (Transcript, p. 13, 
11. 24-25). The failure of the State to keep this promise not only deprived the Defendant of its 
benefit, it also set up the circumstance addressed in Point VI, infra, wherein the sentencing judge 
was so irritated with counsel that it is highly likely the severity of Defendant's sentence was 
increased as a consequence. 
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Despite this possibility, the facts are that a promise was made, the promise was 
broken, and Defendant/Appellant is entitled thereby to have his sentence set aside. 
POINT V 
THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT FULLY COMPLY WITH 
RULE 11 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF PLEAS 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah announced in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987) a strict compliance policy with regard to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which states in pertinent part: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosection witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered,... 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be 
imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including he possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
(h) (2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the 
reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate 
to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be 
approved. 
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(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
The transcripts of the hearings of November 3, 1994, and January 12, 1995, 
clearly show that the sentencing judge did not go over the plea-bargain affidavit with the 
Appellant, nor did he discuss the aspects of the plea bargain itself and possibilities for appeal 
with the Defendant, as required by Rule 11. Instead, he asked the Defendant/Appellant, "[H]as 
you [sic] attorney explained to you your constitutional rights and the consequences of your guilty 
plea?" (Transcript, p. 5,11. 5-7.) And further, "Now, Mr. St. Clair, have you gone over the 
statement with your attorney?" (Transcript, p. 5,11. 21-22.) 
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed the use of affidavits 
and the practice of trial judges relying on defense attorneys to inform clients of the contents of 
the affidavits.1 The Court concluded: 
. . . [T]he affidavit should be only the starting point, not an end point, in the pleading 
process. . . . The trial judge should then review the statements in the affidavit with the 
defendant, question the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other 
requirements imposed by [Rule 11] on the record before accepting the guilty plea. . . . 
This procedure may take additional time, but constitutional rights may not be 
sacrificed in the name of judicial economy. The procedure outlined is designed to assist 
trial judges in making the constitutionally required determination that the defendant's 
plea is truly knowing and voluntary . . . . 
Id. at 1313-4. Had this procedure been followed in the instant case, the court would have 
noticed the statement on page 5 of the Statement of the Defendant, lines 9-11, that "The State has 
JIn the instant case, the instrument serving the purpose of an affidavit was titled 
"Statement of Defendant and Order," a copy of which appears in the Addendum to this brief. 
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also agreed to recommend that I be referred to the diagnostic unit of the Utah State Department 
of Corrections for a sixty (60) day diagnostic evaluation before lam sentenced." [Italics added.] 
Further, the court's statements to the opposing counsel in the sentencing hearing 
(Transcript, p. 12) absolutely precluded the possibility of discussion of the elements of the plea 
bargain agreement, so that no possibility occurred for defense counsel to invoke Subparagraph 
(h)(2) and (3) of Rule 11. Consequently, the Defendant/Appellant had no opportunity to affirm 
or withdraw his plea. 
The appellate courts have affirmed since Gibbons the requirement that Rule 11 be 
strictly complied with (State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App.1991); State v. Dastrup. 
818 P.2d 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1991): State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991)). and have 
vacated convictions for lack of strict compliance (Id., at 218.) The conviction in the instant case 
should be vacated for the same reason. 
POINT VI 
THE JUDGE'S PIQUE AT BOTH THE PROSECUTING AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS LED HIM TO USE PERSONAL DISCRETION, RATHER 
THAN JUDICIAL DISCRETION, IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT/ 
APPELLANT, CONSTITUTING A FURTHER ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Both pages 12 and 13 of the transcript of the sentencing hearing held on January 
19, 1995, reveal the mood of the sentencing judge at the time of these proceedings. The judge 
called the discussions between the opposing counsel a "continual battle" and asked, "Do you 
want me to ban you from talking with each other?" When defense counsel stated, "Judge, I don't 
think we have a battle here," the judge replied, "And you can go to trial because I love to try jury 
cases." 
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Counsel for the State said, "I hesitate to get involved in, [sic] any disagreements." 
The court announced that it was ready to sentence and to proceed. Mr. Parsons asked, "Were we 
going to have [a request] for a 90 day evaluation?" Mr. Jeppesen stated: "Your Honor. I don't 
have anything to that effect in my notes." As stated previously, it seems incredible given the 
prior averments by the state and its preparation of the Defendant's statement that the prosecutor's 
notes would not mention the evaluation request. Nevertheless, the request was not made, and the 
judge's ire had been raised to a level where quite possibly he transcended his judicial discretion 
as a result. 
In Spannv. People. 561 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Colo. 1977), the Colorado Supreme 
Court stated: 
Judicial discretion is not personal discretion. All judicial power is held in trust for 
the people, having been delegated by them through the constitution.... Judicial 
discretion cannot be distorted to camouflage or insulate from appellate review a decision 
based on the judge's personal caprice, hostility or prejudice. 
Cited in State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
The granting or withholding of probation rests entirely within the discretion of the 
trial court. . . . If the exercise of that discretion is based upon reason rather than emotion, 
it will not be disturbed by this Court. 
State v. Cornwall. 518 P.2d 863, 867 (Idaho 1974); cited in Gerrard. supra. Given the court's 
failure to set forth reasons or findings for the imposition of a sentence contrary to the guidelines 
provided through the use of the State's matrices, and given the dialogue at the beginning of this 
hearing, and given the sentence itself, it appears very likely that the sentence was rendered with 
emotion rather than reason, and is therefore subject to being "disturbed" by the Court. 
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POINT VII 
THE JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO GRANT A WITHDRAWAL OF THE 
GUILTY PLEA WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN LIGHT OF 
THE CHARACTER OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DEFENSE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS OF THE PLEA-BARGAIN 
AGREEMENT AND THAT OF THE PROSECUTION. 
Once it became obvious that the counsel for the two parties had conflicting 
notions of the terms of the plea-bargain agreement, the judge had an absolute obligation to set 
aside the guilty plea. Even if he did not recognize that obligation in the heat of the moment, 
when he was presented with Defendant's motion to withdraw the plea, and particularly with the 
memorandum in support of that motion, he should have accepted the obligation and should have 
set aside the guilty plea. The memorandum in support of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea 
identified the particular points in the taped proceedings of the hearings where the prosecutor had 
agreed to ask for a diagnostic evaluation. The Statement of Defendant and Order also contained 
the specific agreement of the prosecutor to ask for a diagnostic evaluation. 
With this evidentiary proof that the Defendant had relied upon a different plea-
bargain agreement than that presented to the Court at the time of the sentencing, the Court had no 
choice under Rule 11 and the case law but to refuse to accept the guilty plea. Under these 
circumstances, when the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was made, it should absolutely have 
been granted, under both pre-Gibbons rulings and post-Gibbons rulings. The Court abused its 
discretion in not allowing the withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is the position of the Appellant that any of the following actions 
by the Appeals Court are appropriate: That first, the Appeals Court may choose to simply 
reverse the trial court on the issue of failing to authorize a withdrawal of the entry of the guilty 
plea and remand the matter for trial on the merits. Secondly, the Appeals Court may determine 
that the trial court has abused its discretion in the character of the sentencing and remand the 
matter with an order requiring the trial court to sentence the Appellant in conformity with the 
sentence imposed upon his Co-defendant. Thirdly, the Appeals Court may choose to set aside 
the sentencing of the Appellant and remand the matter for re-sentencing. Fourth or additional 
alternatives have not been considered by counsel for the Appellant but may be fashioned by the 
Appeals Court. It is the position of the Appellant that one of the forgoing remedies should be 
provided the Appellant, in light of the arguments hereinbefore stated. 
-J-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /5_ day of August, 1995. 
A'Z 3 cr 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Appellant 
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In the district Court of ttje tDjirfr Judicial Btstrtct 
Cooele County g>tate of Titafj 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
AND ORDER 
Criminal No. 
COMES NOW, JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR, the defendant in this case 
and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): COUNT I: THEFT, 
a second degree felony, carrying an indeterminate period of imprisonment in the Utah 
State Prison of between one and fifteen years, a fine of up to $ 10,000.00 and a surcharge 
of 85% of the amount of the fine imposed. COUNT IV: CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a 
third jiegree felony, carrying an indeterminate period of imprisonment in the Utah State 
Prison of up to five years, a fine of up to $5,000.00 and a surcharge of 85% of the 
amount of the fine imposed. 
Page 1 
Statement of the Defendant, JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, and 
I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crimefs) to which I am pleading guilty are as follows: 
COUNT I: that on or about August 16, 1994, in Tooele County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, as a party to the offense, exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
Timothy Ford with the purpose to deprive it thereof, to-wit: an operable 1994 Ford Probe 
motor vehicle. COUNT IV: that on or about August 16, 1994, in Tooele County, State 
of Utah, the defendant intentionally damaged, defaced or destroyed the property of 
Timothy Ford, to-wit: a 1994 Ford F-150 pickup truck. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are as 
follows: I, along with three friends, stole two new vehicles from a local dealership, drove 
them around for a while, and then wrecked them. 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that 
if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
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2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is William B. 
Parsons HI. I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and the 
consequences of my guilty plea(s) with my attorney. 
3. I have read this statement and understand the nature and elements 
of the charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my plea 
of guilty. 
4. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
5. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I 
also know that I have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify 
in court on my behalf. 
6. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf, but if I choose 
not to do so, I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no 
adverse inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
7. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only 
plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will 
have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the 
trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
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8. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and 
convicted by a jury or by the judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and 
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah 
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs and attorney fees for such appeal, those 
expenses would be paid by the State. 
9. I know that the above set forth maximum possible sentence may be 
imposed upon my plea(s) of guilty, and that sentence may be for a prison term, a fine, or 
both. I know that in addition to any fine, a 85% surcharge, required by Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-63a-l, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the court 
to make restitution to any victim or victims of my offense(s). 
10. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine 
for additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am 
incarcerated, on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the present action may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
11. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my 
statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that 
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by entering such plea(s), I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
12. I understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty must 
be filed with the court within 30 days after the entry of my plea(s). I understand further 
that any motion to withdraw my guilty plea(s) will only be granted upon the Court finding 
good cause to do so. 
13. My plea(s) of guilty is the result of a plea bargain between myself and 
the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, 
are fully set forth as follows: the State of Utah has agreed to dismiss Counts II-III, V-VH 
in exchange for my pleas of guilty to Counts I and IV. The State has also agreed to 
recommend that I be referred to the diagnostic unit of the Utah State Department of 
Corrections for a sixty (60) day diagnostic evaluation before I am sentenced. I have also 
agreed to admit to one count of forgery pending in Third District Juvenile Court, and the 
State in turn has agreed to request that disposition in the juvenile case be delayed until 
the diagnostic evaluation is complete, and the evaluation will be utilized in the disposition 
of the juvenile case. I have agreed to be interrogated by the police and truthfully reveal 
all of the offenses I have committed, with as much detail as possible, and the State has 
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agreed not to prosecute any additional offenses which I may reveal or which are pending 
in the juvenile court. There are no other promises. 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation 
of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing 
made or sought by either my defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe 
the court may do are also not binding on the court. 
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been 
made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein have 
been made to me. 
16. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my 
attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of 
the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
18. I am years of age; I have attended school through the 
grade and I can read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence 
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of any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea(s) was made. 
I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, mentally 
capable of understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of 
any mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this day of October, 1994. 
JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR, 
Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR, the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it 
to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands 
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my 
knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and 
the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing statement, are accurate and true. 
William B. Parsons HI 
Attorney for Defendant 
Page 8 
Statement of the Defendant, JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the 
defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage 
a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
statement or as supplemented on the record before the court. There is reasonable cause 
to believe that the evidence would support the conviction for the offense(s) for which the 
plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
Alan K. Jpppesen 
Prosecuting Attorrify 
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ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and certification, 
the court finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is so 
ordered that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the statement be 
accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this day of October, 1994. 
John A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
REGION III, TOOELE 
612 North Main 
Tooele, Utah 34074 
Telephone: 882-1404 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due: October 14, 1994 
Sentencing Date: October 24, 1994 
JUDGE DENNIS M. FUCHS THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE TOOELE UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
MICHAEL HANSEN INVESTIGATOR 
NAME: BLACK, JASON JOHN 
ALIASES: None 
OBSCIS NO.: 00079309 
ADDRESS: 152 6 South 10th East 
Salt Lake City, UT 
BIRTHDATE: 05/03/74 AGE: 20 
BIRTHPLACE: Salt Lake City, UT 
LEGAL RESIDENCE: Utah 
MARITAL STATUS: Single 
COURT CASE NO: 941300108 
CO-DEFENDANTS: Jarrod Howell, 
Jeffery Howell, David Mcune, 
Joshua StClaire 
OFFENSE: THEFT, Second Degree 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, Third Degree 
SENTENCE: 1-15 Years/$10,000 
0-5 Years/$5,000 
PLEA: Guilty DATE: 09/12/94 
PROSECUTING ATTY: Alan Jeppesen 
DEFENSE ATTY: John Mack Dow 
PLEA BARGAIN: In exchange for a plea of guilty to the present 
charges, the State agreed to dismiss two counts of Theft, Second 
Degree Felonies; two counts of Vehicle Burglary, Class A 
Misdemeanors; and one count of Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor. The 
defendant further agreed to pay restitution in all counts. 
OFFENSE: 
A. OFFICIAL VERSION: On June 23, 1994, Annette Nelson of 
Western Pontiac reported that a 1994 Pontiac Grand Am which 
was for sale on their lot had been driven from their lot and 
sustained damage to its undercarriage, shroud and radiator. 
It had then been returned to their lot. 
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BLACK, JASON JOHN 
A. OFFICIAL VERSION: (Continued) 
On August 16, 1994, police received a report that a 1994 
Ford F150 pickup was up Middle Canyon in the middle of the 
road with its windows broken and damage to its panels. That 
same day a 1994 Ford Probe was located northwest of 
Grantsville with broken windows and panels. Both vehicles 
were reported stolen from Timothy Ford/Chrysler Auto 
Dealership in Tooele. 
On August 17, Tooele City Police Detective Lance Sutherland 
received information that a person known as Jason Black was 
involved in the vehicle thefts from Timothy Ford. He also 
received information that the defendant and a person known 
as Pugsley, later identified as David Mcune, were involved 
in the theft of a 1994 Grand Am from Western several months 
back. They had damaged the vehicle and returned it to 
Western. The defendant was located on August 18 and 
voluntarily went to the Tooele City Police Department where 
he was interviewed. The defendant arrived at the police 
department with two other people, Jarrod and Jeffery Howell. 
The defendant agreed to talk to Detective Sutherland after 
being advised of his Miranda rights. 
During an interview with Detective Sutherland, the defendant 
related that he, Jason StClaire, Jarrod Howell, Jeffery 
Howell, and David Mcune had decided to go to Timothy Ford 
and steal some vehicles. The defendant drove his vehicle 
and the four others to the rear of Timothy's where Mcune and 
StClaire exited his vehicle. The group members then agreed 
to meet at the Catholic Church, and the defendant took the 
Howells to the Catholic Church and waited in the parking 
lot. A few minutes later Mcune drove up in a Ford Probe and 
pulled into the parking lot. The defendant also saw a red 
Ford pickup heading up Middle Canyon which was being driven 
by StClaire. The ensemble followed the pickup up Middle 
Canyon passed the paved road some distance where StClaire 
got the pickup stuck. They tried to get the truck free, but 
were unable to free it. The others then started to throw 
rocks and kick the truck. The defendant denied taking part 
in the vandalization of the truck. 
After the group stopped vandalizing the truck, they returned 
to their cars and made arrangements to meet in Settlement 
Canyon where they were going to strip the Probe. The 
defendant drove to the top of Settlement Canyon, but could 
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A. OFFICIAL VERSION: (Continued) 
not find the Probe. He turned around and finally met Mcune 
and Jeffery Howell who were in the Probe at the Masonic 
Temple at the bottom of Settlement Canyon. They then 
decided to go to Grantsville to a place called Little 
Mountain. Once at Little Mountain they started to strip the 
Probe, taking the radio speakers and putting them in the 
defendant's truck. They also took the spare tire and jacks 
and put them in his truck. The four others, the defendant 
again denied taking part, started to drive the Probe around 
the gravel pit, jumping it off small hills, running it into 
hills and spinning circles. After awhile all four began to 
break the windows and beat on body parts. The last thing 
they did was to put a rock on the accelerator and run it 
into a ditch. Following this, they all got into the 
defendant's vehicle, and he drove them back to Tooele. 
Regarding the Grand Am which had been stolen from Western. 
The defendant stated that Mcune had come to a party in 
Settlement Canyon with the car, and he, the defendant, had 
taken the vehicle for a ride with Mcune and StClaire. The 
vehicle apparently sustained damage to its undercarriage 
when the trio went through areas where the stream bed 
crossed the road. The defendant stated Mcune later took the 
vehicle back to Western. 
Following the interview with the defendant, Jeffery and 
Jarrod Howell were interviewed by Detective Sutherland. 
They provided the same basic information as the defendant, 
but stated the reason they took the vehicles from Timothy's 
was because the defendant wanted a new speaker system for 
his truck. They also said the defendant wanted the spare 
tire for his truck. A cellular phone which was taken from 
the pickup was at the Howell residence. 
Joshua StClaire was later located and interviewed. Again, 
he provided the same information regarding the thefts, 
adding he and Mcune had been dropped off at Timothy's by the 
defendant, and Mcune had a key to the lock boxes for the 
vehicle which he used to open the lock boxes on the pickup 
and Probe. StClaire stated Mcune had apparently found the 
key to the boxes when walking through Western Pontiac a few 
months prior to the incident. StClaire also stated he knew 
the defendant, Mcune, and both Howells had gone into Salt 
Lake City on August 17 and had stolen a stereo out of a 
vehicle at one of the car lots on South State Street. 
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A. OFFICIAL VERSION: ( C o n t i n u e d ) 
Detective Sutherland went to the Mcune residence and made 
contact with David Mcune's father, Stephen Mcune. Detective 
Sutherland informed the elder Mcune of what his son David 
had been involved in and asked David for the key. David 
stated it was in his room and went into his room and 
obtained the key. Detective Sutherland then asked David to 
come to the police department for a statement. Later, David 
and his father arrived at the police department, and David 
gave a statement similar to that which the co-defendants had 
made. 
B. DEFENDANT'S VERSION; The following is taken from a 
handwritten statement submitted by the defendant: 
"My friends and I were at cornet when David said he wanted 
to steal some cars and strip them. After a while I gave in 
and said that I wouldn't touch them but Id drive them home 
afterward. They took one up the canyon and it was the truck 
they messed it up and then we took the other to grantsville 
where they totaled it and drove it off a cliff.11 
/s/ Jason Black Dated: 09/16/94 
C. CO-DEFENDANT'S STATUS; Jarrod Howell, Jeffery Howell, and 
David Mcune are juveniles and have been referred to juvenile 
court. Joshua StClaire has been charged with similar 
offenses as the defendant, and his case is presently 
awaiting adjudication in adult court. 
D. VICTIM'S IMPACT STATEMENT: Rachel Ruybal, controller of 
Timothy Ford/Chrysler and Western Pontiac, submitted a 
Victim Impact Statement stating the corporation would 
request full restitution to them for monies not reimbursed 
by insurance and to the insurance company. They would also 
recommend the defendants perform community service in which 
he would be required to learn respect for other's property. 
E. RESTITUTION: Timothy Ford/Chrysler and Western Pontiac 
submitted the following list of damages: 
1994 Ford Probe (totalled) $16,000 
1991 Ford F150 pickup damages $ 7,060 
1994 Pontiac Grand Am damages $ 762 
TOTAL DAMAGES $23,822 
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E. RESTITUTION: (Continued) 
Timothy's insurance, Universal Underwriters, have paid a 
total of $15,714 leaving a balance owed to Timothy of 
$8,108- A cellular phone was also removed from the Ford 
pickup which belonged to Timothy Ford. That phone has been 
recovered and is presently in evidence. It is not known 
whether the phone was damaged during the theft, if not, the 
phone would just have to be reactivated. 
F. CUSTODY STATUS: The defendant was booked into the Tooele 
County Jail on August 24 and has been in custody since that 
time, a total of 61 days as of October 24. 
G. PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT: No statement was received from the 
Tooele County Attorney's Office. 
H. DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S STATEMENT: John Mack Dow will reserve 
comment until the time of sentencing. 
I. LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: Detective Sutherland said the 
defendant was cooperative with him during his investigation 
when it was to the defendant's benefit. Detective 
Sutherland related that at least two other co-defendants had 
indicated they committed the crimes because the defendant 
wanted a new stereo system and speakers for his truck. They 
also said the defendant took part in some of the 
vandalization of the vehicles. Detective Sutherland said he 
has also heard the defendant made some threats to other 
people in the community who may have knowledge about the 
crimes. Regarding the alleged vehicle burglary in Salt 
Lake, Detective Sutherland has recovered a stereo, but has 
been unable to determine where it was stolen from to date. 
Detective Sutherland does not believe the defendant should 
go to prison, but he does believe the sentence should make 




AGENCY DATE OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
Cache CO 11/22/86 Burglary Non-Dwelling Probation By Probation 
SO 3rd Degree Department/Work Hours 
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A. JUVENILE: (Continued) 
AGENCY DATE OFFENSE 
Cache CO 
SO 
11/22/86 Theft, Class A 
02/11/87 Review 
Tooele PD 08/11/89 Theft $100 or Less 
Non-Judicial 
DISPOSITION 





Tooele PD 09/23/91 
Tooele PD 09/23/91 
Tooele PD 09/23/91 
B. ADULT: 
Shooting In Restricted Restitution/Fine 
Area 
Destruction Of Property $250 Plus Restitution/ 
Fine 
Destruction Of Property $250 Plus Restitution/ 
Fine 
AGENCY DATE OFFENSE 




Pending Cases: None known• 
Probation/Parole History: None available. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: Jason John 
Black was born in Salt Lake City to the union of Jack and Letha 
Black. Initially he grew up in the Salt Lake area where his 
parents divorced when he was five years old. He remained in the 
custody of his mother who remarried when the defendant was 8, and 
the family moved to Hiram, Utah, where his stepfather was 
employed with Valley Metals. The family moved to Tooele in 1986 
following his stepfather obtaining employment at a local car 
dealership in Tooele. In addition to himself, the defendant/s 
extended family included two stepsisters, a stepbrother, a half 
sister, and a younger sister who died as an infant. The 
defendant reports no history of any type of abuse while growing 
up nor having any serious family problems with the exception of 
some problems with his stepfather when the defendant was a 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: (Continued; 
teenager which included several physical altercations. The 
defendant relates that since his stepfather and mother divorced 
in 1992, his relationship with his stepfather has improved, and 
he now enjoys good relationships with all family members. 
Following his graduation from high school, the defendant moved 
out of his home to get an apartment, but moved back in with his 
mother in Salt Lake City several months before his arrest for 
this offense. 
MARITAL HISTORY: The defendant is single and has no plans for 
marriage in the immediate future. 
EDUCATION: The defendant graduated from Tooele High School in 
1992 and has successfully completed a welding course through Salt 
Lake Community College since his graduation. 
ORGANIZATIONAL OR COMMUNITY AFFILIATIONS: None. 
HEALTH: 
A. Physical: The defendant states his overall physical health 
is good. He has sustained several serious injuries in his 
life, one being an injury to his shoulder which prevented 
him from playing football his senior year. He was also 
involved in two car accidents as a child; however, those 
accidents have left no lasting disabilities. 
B. Mental: The defendant describes his emotional health as 
"pretty good." He has never been referred to a mental 
health specialist for counseling. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE: 
A* Alcohol: The defendant stated he began to use alcohol at 
age 16 and drinks approximately every other weekend or as 
much as possible. He believes he can benefit from alcohol 
treatment and states alcohol played a part in the present 
offenses, but he accepts responsibility for the decisions he 
made. 
B, Drugs: The defendant denies the use or experimentation of 
any illicit drug or the abuse of prescription drugs. 
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REASON FOR LEAVING 
Jailed 
01/94-05/94 Laid Off 
Laborer 09/93-11/93 Lack Of 
Transportation 
Comments; The defendant asserted his ex-boss at Pace has advised 
him he still has a job once he is out of jail. 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: 
Present Monthly Income: -0-
Other Income: -0-
Total Monthly Income: -0-
Total Debts: $3,000 for vehicle 
Comments: The defendant stated his mother is presently making 
his car payments of $156 per month while he is incarcerated. 
When he is released, he intends to move back home with her and 
gain employment and pay her in full for the money she has 
expended. 
MILITARY RECORD: The defendant has never served in the military. 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: Lynn Berry, the defendant's stepfather, 




by the typ 
committed 
this. 
the defendant had some emotional problems while 
due to his mother's divorce in trying to fit in 
real father. He believes the defendant was influenced 
e of friends he was hanging around with when he 
these crimes and hopes the defendant will learn from 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY; Appearing before the court for sentencing 
for one count of Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and one count of 
Criminal Mischief, a Third Degree Felony, is 20-year-old Jason 
John Black. In this incident the defendant and four co-
defendants stole a total of three vehicles from two dealerships 
in Tooele damaging two of the vehicles, a Ford pickup and a 
Pontiac Grand Am, and caused such extensive damage to a third, a 
Ford Probe, that it was totalled. The incidents occurred in the 
summer of 1994 and were able to occur due to the fact one of the 
co-defendants apparently had a key to the lock boxes for the 
dealerships. As noted, the defendants' conduct caused 
substantial damages to all three vehicles which totalled in 
excess of $23,000. The defendant was cooperative with police 
during the investigation and voluntarily confessed to his parts 
in the crime. Several of the co-defendants maintain the 
defendant was instrumental in beginning the crime spree as he 
wanted a speaker system for his truck and encouraged them to 
participate in the crime. The defendant denies this stating it 
was one of the co-defendants who brought up the idea, and he was 
the only participant who did not participate in any of the 
vehicle vandalism. 
The defendant has a minimal criminal history though he does have 
several entries for theft-related offenses as a juvenile. The 
defendant does not lack education and in fact has sustained post 
high schcol training. He appears to enjoy good family support 
and readily admits responsibility for his actions in this offense 
and the fact he made poor decisions in joining in these criminal 
activities. It appears the defendant could benefit from 
substance abuse counseling, particularly with alcohol, but he 
does not appear to have any serious substance abuse problem that 
cannot be dealt with at this time if he is willing to make the 
proper commitment. It is believed the defendant is an excellent 
candidate for probation though it is felt additional punitive 
sanctions should be imposed on the defendant due to the large 
amount of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A G E N C Y R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 
It is respectfully recommended by the staff of Adult Probation 
and Parole that the defendant be favorably considered for 
probation for 3 6 months with the following special conditions: 
(1) That he serve 12 0 days in the Tooele County 
Jail with credit for time served; 
(2) That he be jointly and severely responsible 
for restitution in the amount of $23,822; 
(3) That he pay $3 00 recoupment fee; 
(4) That he undergo a substance abuse evaluation 
and successfully complete any treatment 
recommended by Adult Probation and Parole; 
(5) That he not consume or possess any alcoholic 
beverage while on probation; 
(6) That he not frequent any bar or liquor store; 
(7) That he perform 200 hours community service 
in lieu of the court ordered fine. 
APPROVED, 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRIMINAL IH r D\ nY ASSESSMENT 
I O R F E L O N Y C O N V I C T I O N 
SEPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS) 
!OR MISD. CONVICTIONS 
EPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS) 
JCLUDES DUI & RECKLESS) 
XCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 
IOR JUVENILE REFERRALS 
1NDINGS OF DELINQUENT FOR 
WCIDENTS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
ELONIES IF COMMITTED BY AN ADULT) 
NON-STATUS MISD. = 1 FELONY] 
PERVISION HISTORY 















MORE THAN THREE 
NONE 
ONE 
TWO TO FOUR 
FIVE TO SEVEN 
MORE THAN SEVEN 
NONE 
ONE 
TWO TO FOUR 
MORE THAN FOUR 
SECURE PLACEMENT 
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NO PRIOR SUPERVISION 
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PRIOR REVOCATION 
CURRENT SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
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NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS 
FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFF.) OR OUTSTANDING WARRANT 
ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROG. OR EXTRADITION REQ'D 




FIREARM OR EXPLOSIVE 
" NOTE: 2nd FIREARMS CONVICTION 
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CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE •• 
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AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
''Cse For*? 2 For Mandatory Sentence Situations v< 
J.jcle the numbers of circumstances trac nay justify depcirti*re fronr ere 
; LJelmes. Reference trie page nuir.oer of tne presentence ir.vescigac: ^ r 
"he judge can find supportive information 
Aggravating Circumstances 
' nly use aggravating circumstances if ciaey are not implicit m the ccv: 
~* ffer.se or the calculation of criminal history score. 
Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive. 
Offense was characterized by -extreme cruelty or depravity. 
There were multiple charges or victims. 
Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less 
restrictive setting. 
Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest 
Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify 
as an high risk offender. 
10. Other (specify) 
Mitigating Circumstances 
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened 
serious harm. 
2. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal 
behavior, though failing to establish a defense. 
I J*$ Offender is young. 
/-3 / 5.} Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other 
crimes. 
^ (J>J. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
8. Domestic crime victim does not want incarceration. 
9. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family 
relationships. 
10. Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or 
dependents. 
11. Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due: January 2, 1995 
Sentencing Date: January 12, 1995 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE TOOELE UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
MICHAEL HANSEN INVESTIGATOR 
NAME: ST. CLAIR, JOSHUA JACOB 
ALIASES: None 
OBSCISNO.: 00080125 
ADDRESS: 355 West 700 South 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
BIRTHDATE: 08/01/1976 AGE: 18 
BIRTHPLACE: Salt Lake City, Utah 
LEGAL RESIDENCE: Utah 
MARITAL STATUS: Never Married 
COURT CASE NO: 941300149 
CO-DEFENDANTS: Jason Black/Jarrod 
Howell/Jeffery Howell/David Mcune 
OFFENSE: THEFT, Second Degree 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, Third Degree 
SENTENCE: 1-15 Years/$10,000 
0-5 Years/$5,000 
PLEA: Guilty DATE: 11/03/94 
PROSECUTING ATTV: Alan Jeppesen 
DEFENSE ATTY: John Mack Dow 
PLEA BARGAIN: In exchange for a plea of guilty to the present offenses, the State agreed 
to dismiss one additional count of Theft, a Second Degree Felony, one additional count of 
Criminal Mischief, a Third Degree Felony, one count of Burglary Of A Vehicle, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, one count of Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, and one count of Theft, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. 
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ST. CLAIR, JOSHUA JACOB 
OFFENSE: 
A, OFFICIAL VERSION: On June 23, 1994, Annette Nelson of Western Pontiac 
reported that a 1994 Pontiac Grand Am which was for sale on their lot had been 
driven from their lot and sustained damage to its undercarriage, shroud, and radiator. 
It had then been returned to their lot. 
On August 16, 1994, police received a report that a 1994 Ford F150 pickup was up 
Middle Canyon in the middle of the road with its windows broken and damage to its 
panels. That same day a 1994 Ford Probe was located northwest of Grantsville with 
broken windows and panels. Both vehicles were reported stolen from Timothy 
Ford/Chrysler Auto Dealership in Tooele. 
On August 17, Tooele City Police Detective Lance Sutherland received information 
that a person known as Jason Black was involved in the vehicle thefts from Timothy 
Ford. He also received information that Black and a person known as Pugsley, later 
identified as David Mcune, were involved in the theft of a 1994 Grand Am from 
Western several months back. They had damaged the vehicle and returned it to 
Western. Jason Black was located on August 18 and voluntarily went to the Tooele 
City Police Department where he was interviewed Black arrived at the police 
department with two other people, Jarrod and Jeffery Howell. Black agreed to talk to 
Detective Sutherland after being advised of his Miranda rights. 
During an interview with Detective Sutherland, Black related he, the defendant, Jarrod 
and Jeffery Howell, and David Mcune had decided to go to Timothy Ford and steal 
some vehicles. Black had driven his vehicle and the four others to the rear of 
Timothy's where the defendant and Mcune exited his vehicle. The group members 
agreed to meet at the Catholic Church, and Black took the Howells to the church and 
waited in the parking lot. A few minutes later Mcune drove up in a Ford Probe and 
pulled into the parking lot. Black also saw a red Ford pickup heading up Middle 
Canyon which was being driven by the defendant. The ensemble followed the pickup 
up Middle Canyon passed the paved road some distance where the defendant had 
gotten the pickup stuck. They tried to get the truck free, but were unable to free it. 
They then started to throw rocks and kick the truck. 
After the group stopped vandalizing the truck, they returned to their cars and made 
arrangements to meet in Settlement Canyon where they were going to strip the Probe. 
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A. OFFICIAL VERSION: (Continued) 
Black drove to the top of Settlement Canyon, but could not find the Probe. He turned 
around and finally met Mcune and Jeffery Howell who were in the Probe at the 
Masonic Temple at the bottom of Settlement Canyon. They decided to go to 
Grantsville to a place called Little Mountain. Once at Little Mountain they started to 
strip the Probe, taking the radio speakers and putting them in Black's truck along with 
the spare tire and jack. The group started to drive the Probe around the gravel pit, 
jumping it off small hills, running it into hills and spinning circles. After awhile all 
four began to break the windows and beat on the car. The last thing they did was to 
put a rock on the accelerator and run it into a ditch. Following this, they all got into 
Black's vehicle, and were driven back to Tooele. 
Regarding the Grand Am which had been stolen from Western, Black stated Mcune 
had come to a party in Settlement Canyon with the car, and he had taken the vehicle 
for a ride with Mcune and the defendant. The vehicle apparently sustained damage to 
its undercarriage when the trio went through areas where the stream bed crossed the 
road. Mcune later took the vehicle back to Western. 
Following the interview with Black, Jeffery and Jarrod Howell were interviewed by 
Detective Sutherland. They provided the same basic information as Black, but stated 
the reason they took the vehicles from Timothy's was because Black wanted a new 
speaker system for his truck. They also said Black wanted the spare tire for his truck. 
The defendant was later located and interviewed. Again, he provided the same 
information regarding the thefts, adding he and Mcune had been dropped off at 
Timothy's by Black. Mcune had a key to the lock boxes for the vehicle which he used 
to open the lock boxes on the pickup and Probe. The defendant added Mcune had 
apparently found the key to the boxes when walking through Western Pontiac a few 
months prior to the incident The defendant also stated he knew Black, Mcune, and 
both Howells had gone into Salt Lake City on August 17 and had stolen a stereo out 
of a vehicle at one of the car lots on South Slate Street. 
The defendant also admitted to forging three checks he had stolen from a Michelle 
Phillips and to stealing two other vehicles in the Tooele area over the past months. 
He had taken the vehicles because he needed a ride to other pans of town He 
abandoned them after he was through with them. 
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A- OFFICIAL VERSION; (Continued) 
Detective Sutherland went to the Mcune residence and made contact with David 
Mcune's father, Stephen Mcune. Detective Sutherland informed the elder Mcune of 
what his son David had been involved in and asked David for the key. David stated it 
was in his room and went into his room and obtained the key. Detective Sutherland 
then asked David to come to the police department for a statement. Later, David and 
his father arrived at the police department, and David gave a statement similar to that 
of the other co-defendants. 
B. DEFENDANTS VERSION: The following is taken from a handwritten statement 
submitted by the defendant on December I, 1994: 
"I was down in cornets parking lot and tried acid for the first time. Some guys talked 
me into stealing a truck with them and so 1 did. i took a truck, another guy took a 
car. The truck got stuck in Middle Canyon and everyone was kicking and denting the 
truck so I did too. We then left, and me and Jason were in his own truck and 
everyone else was in the stolen car. We met them in Grantsville and everyone but me 
and Jason totaled the car. Then we all went home." /$/ Joshua I St. Clair 
C -^CO-DEFENDANT'S STATUS: Jarrod Howell, Jeffery Howell, and David Mcune 
are juveniles and have been referred to juvenile court. Jason Black entered pleas of 
guilty to the identical charges and was sentenced to 36 months probation with 
condition he serve 120 days in jail, pay $8,108 in restitution, and attend substance 
abuse counseling" ~"~ * 
D. VICTIM'S IMPACT STATEMENT: Rachel Ruybal, controller of Timothy 
Ford/Chrysler and Western Pontiac, submitted a Victim Impact Statement stating the 
corporation would request full restitution to them for monies not reimbursed by 
insurance and to the insurance company. They would also recommend the defendants 
perform community service in which they would be required to leam respect for 
other's property, 
E. RESTITUTION; Timothy Ford/Chrysler and Western Pontiac submitted the 
following list of damages: 1994 Ford Probe (totalled) $16,000 
1991 Ford F150 pickup damages , , . $ 7,060 
1994 Pontiac Grand Am damages . . $ 762 
Total Damages $23,822 
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E. RESTITUTION: (Continued) 
Timothy's insurance, Universal Underwriters, have paid a total of $15,714 leaving a 
balance owed to Timothy of $8,108. A cellular phone was also removed from the 
Ford pickup which belonged to Timothy Ford. That phone has been recovered and is 
presently in evidence. It is not known whether the phone was damaged during the 
theft, if not, the phono would just have to be reactivated. 
F. CUSTODY STATUS; The defendant was booked into the Tooele County Jail on 
August 18, 1994, and was released on his own recognizance later the same day. 
G. PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT: Alan Jeppesen will reserve comment until the 
time of sentencing. 
H. DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S STATEMENT: John Mack Dow will reserve comment 
until the time of sentencing. 
1. LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: Detective Sutherland said the defendant is 
responsible for quite a few vehicle thefts in the area over the last few months, and he 
does not believe the defendant will change his behavior because he does not care. He 
would recommend the defendant receive a similar sentence as Jason Black. 
PRIOR RECORD: 
A. JUVENILE: Records of the Utah Juvenile Court list the following referrals: 
DATE OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
06/04/91 Criminal Trespass Non-Judicial Work Assignment 
05/13/92 Criminal Trespass-Dwelling Non-Judicial Theme Or Essay 
05/30/92 Curfew Fine 
06/06/92 Shoplift $100 Or Less Fine 
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A. JUVENILE: (Continued) 
BATE OFFENSE 
09/07/92 Burglary-Dwelling, 2nd Degree 
Theft Over $1000, 2nd Degree 
Theft $100 Or Less 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Destruction Of Property Under $250 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Destruction Of Property Under $250 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Destruction Of Property Under $250 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Destruction Of Property Under $250 
Theft $101-$250 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $101-$250, Class A 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $251-$1,000, 3rd Degree 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Destruction Of Property $250-$500 
Theft $1014250, Class A 
DISPOSITION 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Restitution/Stayed DT Order-Short 
Term Disposition 
Dismissed On Motion Of County 
Attorney-Insufficient Evidence 
Restitution 
Dismissed On Motion Of County 
Attorney-Insufficient Evidence 




Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
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A. JUVENILE: (Continued) 
DATE OFFENSE 
09/07/92 Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $100 Or Less, Class B 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $101-$250, Class A 
Destruction Of Property $250-$500 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $101-$250, Class A 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $100 Or Less, Class B 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $101-$250, Class A 
Destruction Of Property Under $250 
Burglary Of Vehicle 
Theft $100 Or Less, Class B 
Car Theft, 2nd Degree 
Possession Of Dangerous Weapon 
12/04/92 Habitual Truancy 
12/10/92 Possession Of Tobacco 
DISPOSITION 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Dismissed-Insufficient Evidence 
Restitution/Stayed DT Order-Short 
Term Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
Restitution/Stayed DT Order-Short 
Term Disposition 
Stayed DT Order-Short Term 
Disposition 
No Action Taken After Counseling 
Fine 
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A, JUVENILE: (Continued) 
DATE OFFENSE 
01/05/93 Possession Of Tobacco 
03/05/93 Review 
03/19/93 Review 
09/21/93 Theft $101-$250, Class A 
Possession Of Tobacco 
11/10/93 Assault-Substantial Risk Of Bodily 
Injury 
06/10/94 Joynde Driver Return Under 24 Hours 
06/18/94 Theft $100 Or Less, Class B 
DISPOSITION 
Fine 
06/18/94 Burglary Of Vehicle 
06/19/94 Joy ride Driver Return Under 24 Hours 
06/21/94 Forgery-Check Less Than $10 
06/23/94 Forgery-Check Less Than $10 
Forgery-Check Less Than $10 
07/02/94 Curfew 
Probation By Probation Department 
Work Hours Ordered 
Probation Terminated 
Fine 
No Action Taken By Intake 
Fine 
Dismissed-Interest Of Justice As Part 
Of Plea Bargain 
Dismissed-Interest Of Justice As Part 
Of Plea Bargain 
Dismissed-Interest Of Justice As Part 
Of Plea Bargain 
Dismissed-Interest Of Justice As Part 
Of Plea Bargain 
Restitution 
Dismissed-Interest Of Justice As Part 
Of Plea Bargain 
Dismissed-Interest Of Justice As Part 
Of Plea Bargain 
Fine 
10/28/94 Review Restitution Ordered 
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B. ADULT: The Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification and the Tooele County 
Attorney's Office show the following entries: 
AGENCY DATE OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
Tooele PD 08/18/94 Auto Theft (2 Counts) Present Offense 
Pending Cases: None known. 
Probation/Parole History: Mr. Kyle Memmott, juvenile probation officer, was at a 
loss to explain the defendant's criminal behavior as the defendant came from a good 
home and had all the advantages of a middle class upbringing, Mr Memmott said the 
defendant was compliant and easy to work with while he was on juvenile probation, 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: Joshua 
Jacob St. Clair is the oldest of two children born to Jeff and Penny St. Clair of Tooele, Utah. 
He was born in Salt Lake City but has been a lifelong resident of Tooele having graduated 
from Tooele Valley High School in 1994, The defendant has spent his entire life in his 
parents home where the family was supported by his father's employment as a welder at the 
Tooele Army Depot and his mother was a homemaker. Mr. St. Clair asserted he had a 
"great" childhood being raised in a middle class home with no history of abuse or neglect. 
He described his relationship with his parents and younger brother as good as it has been 
throughout his life. At the time of his arrest the defendant was living at his parents home 
rent free and was working off and on through the Carpentry Union in Salt Lake City. 
MARITAL HISTORY: The defendant has never been married though he states he would 
like to marry 16-year-old Michele Austin in a couple of years, after she gets out of high 
school. 
EDUCATION: The defendant graduated from Tooele Valley High School in 1994 and has 
not furthered his formal education since that time. He indicated he would like to attend some 
education but is unsure what vocation he would like to study. 
ORGANIZATIONAL OR COMMUNITY AFFILIATIONS: The defendant stated he is a 
member of the Carpentry Union m Salt Lake City and has been working at temporary jobs 
that serves the union since graduating from high school. 
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HEALTH: 
A. Physical; The defendant has always enjoyed good physical health. He has no 
history of any serious injury, illness or disability. 
B. Mental: Mr. St Clair describes his emotional health as good with no history of any 
suicide considerations or other psychological problems. He has never been referred to 
mental health specialists for any problems. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE: 
A. Alcohol: Mr. St. Clair stated he began to drink alcohol at age 16 and claims to have 
been a heavy dnnker of alcohol following high school graduation. Since his arrest for 
this offense, the defendant maintains he has moderated his drinking behavior and has 
been trying to cut down. He contended he has been under the influence when he 
committed most of this criminal offense. He has never received alcohol counseling. 
B. Drugs: The defendant maintains he has used LSD and in fact was on the substance 
the night he committed the present offenses He asserts this was the only time he has 




Salt Lake City, UT 
Glowing Embers 
Tooele, UT 
COMMENTS: As one might expect due to the defendant's young age, he has no substantial 
job history. He related he has worked approximately one month at carpentry jobs since he 
joined the union in September 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: 

















PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
ST. CLAIR, JOSHUA JACOB 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: (Continued) 
Total Monthly Income! -0-
Total Debts: -0-
COMMENTS: The defendant is living at his parents home in Tooele and is being 
supported by them. He augments this situation through jobs he is able to get though he is 
just starting out 
MILITARY RECORD: The defendant has never served in the military. 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: The defendant's father, Jeff St. Clair, verified the 
defendant's background and present living situation. He also submitted a letter on behalf of 
his son which is attached. 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY 
Joshua Jacob St Clair is a 18-year-old male who is before the court for sentencing for the 
offenses of Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and Criminal Mischief, a Third Degree Felony. 
These crimes occurred in August of this year in which the defendant and several 
co-defendants stole at least two vehicles from an auto dealer in Tooele, totalling one vehicle 
and severely damaging the other. Damage to the vehicles is in excess of $25,000, The dealer 
has been reimbursed by his insurance for the majority of damages; however, the dealer has 
had to make good in excess of $8,000 of its own money to repair the vehicles. The defendant 
is one of two adults who was charged with this crime, the other adult having already plead 
guilty to similar offenses and is currently serving a 180 day jail sentence. He has also been 
ordered to pay $8,108 in restitution, the remainder of restitution being reduced to a civil 
judgment by Judge Fuchs at the time of sentencing. The three juveniles have been referred to 
juvenile court. 
The defendant is only 18 years old and is already involved in the adult criminal justice 
system in a substantial way. His juvenile record is lengthy with numerous referrals to 
juvenile court for property offenses including several felonies. The defendant was on juvenile 
probation for approximately six months in 1993 but apparently failed to learn any long lasting 
lessons in his dealing with that court system. He was raised in a middle class economic 
environment and still maintains a close relationship with his family. He has limited job skills 
in part due to his young age and it would appear he would benefit from some type of formal 
training or education. In regards to his substance abuse problem, considering the fact it is 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
ST. CLAIR, JOSHUA JACOB 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY (Continued) 
illegal for him to consume or possess an alcoholic beverage, his drinking problem may be 
more serious than what he is admitting to. He denies any other substance abuse problem 
stating he has only tried LSD on one occasion, the night of this incident. The defendant offers 
no long range plans for his future other than to get a job and got out on his own but is 
waitmg to get the present court situation behind him. His cooperation with this agency in 
arranging for this report is less than satisfactory leading Adult Probation and Parole to 




A G E N C Y R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 
It is respectfully recommended by the staff of Adult Probation and Parole that the defendant 
be favorably considered for probation for 36 months with the following special conditions: 
(1) That he serve 120 days in the Tooele County Jail with ^ ^ &L&^ ^Jh)cR^ 
credit for time served; ' 
(2) That he be, jointly^aftd-4everelv responsible for restitution in 
the amount ( j ^ U i i S ^ t h the remaining $15,714 being —rp i' *J?„ c o , 
entered as a civil judgment against the defendant; lictlt 
(3) That he pay $300 recoupment fee; 
(4) That he undergo a substance abuse evaluation and 
successfully complete any treatment recommended by Adult 
Probation and Parole; 
(5) That he not consume or possess any alcoholic beverage 
while on probation; 
(6) That he not frequent any bar or liquor store; 
(7) That he perform 200 hours community service in lieu of 
the court ordered fine, 




RONALD D. COOK, SUPERVISOR 
k:\stclair.jos 
Question 6-Joshua St*Clair 
Josh has been brought up in what I would call a normal family 
atmosphere. He has suffered two losses through death which 
affected him. His grandmother (Loila Jardine, mothers mother) died 
in 1988. He was very close to her. He was 12 when she died. He 
also lost his uncle (Monte St.Clair, fathers brother) in 1990. 
They were also close. Those two losses were tough on the whole 
family. We tried to talk about these deaths the best we could but 
being from St.Clair heritage holding feelings deep inside seems to 
be the norm. It comes naturally. We know it is wrong so we all 
fight it but it's a constant battle. 
When Josh was very young it was obvious to us that he was very 
intelligent. He seemed to fit in very well and was quite popular. 
As he grew older his friends seemed to change because of church 
affiliation. Josh's mother was brought up LDS but is not active, 
his father is uncommitted. At an early age we wanted Josh to 
experience the joys of scouting. He was very excited about being 
a scout. He attempted to become a scout but it seemed that every 
time the troop had something planned he wasn't notified. Maybe the 
word was given out on Sunday when he wasn't present I don't know. 
No matter how many times we contacted the scoutmaster it seemed 
that Josh was ignored by the scoutmaster time after time. He did 
meet a friend through the scouts but he turned out to be a bad 
influence and the beginning of troubled times for Josh. Josh 
finally gave up on the scouts. 
The friend who was a bad influence on Josh was David Theobald. 
David seemed to be a good kid. I coached him on a little league 
baseball team. I noticed that he was a free sole and spent a lot 
of time by himself. He was one of the only kids in our 
neighborhood who was Josh's age so we were glad to have him around. 
As time went along we were contacted by the police that Josh 
had been in a vacant house and some damage had been done. When 
questioned Josh told the police that David had done the damage. We 
checked into the situation and were told by the juvenile 
authorities that David was known for such trouble. We tried to 
discourage Josh from seeing David. We started a communication gap 
at that point. Josh seemed to rebel against us picking his 
friends. From that point Josh seemed to spend more time with David 
and other kids who had been in trouble. 
Josh entered high school doing pretty well. He had always 
enjoyed sports so we hoped he would get involved. His new friends 
didn't play sports so he didn't make much of an effort. More and 
more of his friends started dropping out of regular school and 
going on to the "home study" program. Soon this was the only 
alternative available to Josh so he went on it also. (over) 
Josh stayed on home study for several months. He was doing 
very well but missed the other students. He applied to Tooele 
Valley High School and was accepted. This turned out to be a very 
positive experience for him. He graduated with honors. He took 
some tests for the Services(army, navy, etc.) and did very well-
He has been recruited heavily ever since. 
During the summer after he graduated we hounded him to make a 
decision as to what he wanted to do with the rest of his life. He 
was unsure whether he wanted to join the service or go to college• 
As time went along I became concerned that the people he was 
hanging around with had no intentions of going to college or 
joining the service. I could see Josh needed to step back and take 
a look at the big picture so I talked him into going to stay with 
my brother Tim St*Clair who has been through extensive college and 
has a masters degree in journalism and is currently working at the 
West Seattle Herald. Tim has had many experiences from working for 
Gov- Scott Matheson to working in a restaurant in Boston. Had this 
visit taken place I don't think we would be in this situation. The 
only problem was Josh got involved with the stolen vehicles before 
his trip to Seattle. 
I have always tried to teach my sons that they must take 
responsibility for their actions. I don't know why Josh did what 
he did but I do know that he is a follower. Josh has a kind heart 
and goes out of his way not to harm someone. He is quite shy. He 
is a hard worker when he puts his mind to it. 
My hope for Josh is that he can turn his life around before it 
is too late because he has so much to offer• I think he might be 
on the right track. 
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DEGREE YEARS MONTHS 
TOTAL 
SENTENCES SHOULD GENERALLY BE CONCURRENT. HOWEVER, THE EXISTENCE 
OF THE FOLLOWING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST CONSIDERATION 
OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. 
1. ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE 
2. UNDER SUPERVISION OR BAIL RELEASE WHEN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED 
3. UNUSUAL VICTIM VUNERABILITY 
4 INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS EXTREME FOR CRIME CATEGORY 
5. OFFENSE CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME CRUELTY OR DEPRAVITY 
IF THE SENTENCES ARE TO BE CONSECUTIVE, USE THE CONSECUTIVE ENCHANEMENTS 
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Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the 
guidelines. Reference the page number of the presentence investigation where 
the judge can find supportive information. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in the conviction 
offense or the calculation of criminal history j>coru, 
PS I Page J^ 
Q-) Q (]// Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
2. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
_ ^ 3. Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
"_ ^ 4 (u) Injury to person or property toss was unusually extensive. 
JL Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. 
I (M There were multiple charges or victims. 
7. Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less 
restrictive setting. 
8. Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest. 
9. Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify 
as an high risk offender. 
]0. Other (specify) , . 
Mitigating Circumstances 
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened 
serious harm. 
._____, ?. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal 
behavior, though failing to establish a defense. 
Offender is young. 
Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other 
crimes. 
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
8. Domestic crime victim does not wanL incarceration. 
9. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family 
relationships. 
10. Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or 
dependents. 
11. Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time. 
12. Other (specify) 
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REASON FOR DEPARTURE . 
COMMUNITY DEMAND 
SENTENCE ACTUALLY IMPOSED 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
JOSHUA JACOB ST CLAIR 
Defendant. 
John A. Rokich 







UTAH STATE PRISON 




There being no legal or other reason why sentence should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted 
by D a jury; D the court; S p l e a of guilty; • plea of no contest; of the offense of 
F2 - Theft F3 - Criminal Mischief 
a felony of the 
for sentence and represented by _ 
by Alan K. Jeppesen 
sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
Judge's 
Initials 
degree;, defendant being now present in court and ready 
Wi l l i am B r a d P a r s o n s
 a n c j the State being represented 













to a min imum mandatory term of _ 
not to exceed five years; C o u n t IV 
years and which may be for life. 
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
not ' less than five years and which may be for life; 
not to exceed years; 
and to pay a fine in the amount of $ . 
Count I 
and to pay restitution in the amount of $ 8108 .00 to 
each other such sentence is to run concurrent ly with 
such sentence is to run consecutively wi th 
upon mot ion of D State, • Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
is/are hereby dismissed. 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of 
Adul t Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached condi t ions 
of p robat ion . 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Tooele County, for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where defendant shall be conf ined and imprisoned in 
accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
19th day of January 19 95 . 
Defense Counsel 
u.. *-
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
County At torney Page. Z_of_^_ 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III (#2535) 
Attorney at Law 
440 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 466-6311 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs- ] 
JOSHUA JACOB ST.CLAIR, ] 
Defendant. ; 
I MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL 
I OF GUILTY PLEA 
i Case No. 941300149 
) Hon. John A. Rokich 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney of 
record, and moves the Court for an Order allowing Defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea. This Motion is accompanied by a 
Memorandum in support thereof. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 1995. 
/ > / _ _ _ ^ 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing 
MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA by depositing a true and 
correct copy thereof in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Alan K. Jeppesen 
Deputy County Attorney 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, UT 84074 
on this 27th day of January, 1995. 
/ > / 
Secretary 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III (#2535) 
Attorney at Law 
440 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 466-6311 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- ] 
JOSHUA JACOB ST.CLAIR, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
I MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL 
i OF GUILTY PLEA 
I Case No. 941300149 
I Hon. John A. Rokich 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney of 
record, and submits the following Memorandum in support of his 
Motion to allow the Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. 
This Motion is made because at the time of the Juvenile 
Court hearing involving this Defendant (Juvenile Court of Tooele 
County, Case No. 809869), the prosecution made mention that he 
was going to participate in a plea bargain with a recommendation 
that the Defendant would be directed for a ninety-day evaluation. 
This statement can be heard in the Juvenile Court tape of 
proceedings for October 28, 1994. 
At the time of the plea on the felony first appearance, 
we again referenced that there would be a recommendation from the 
prosecutor and the defense that the Defendant be submitted for a 
ninety-day evaluation. This statement can be heard on the tape 
of the proceedings of the District Court for November 3, 1994. 
Then, at the time of the final sentencing on 
January 12, 1995, when I indicated that the prosecution was going 
to make this recommendation for a ninety-day evaluation, the 
prosecutor said he had no notes as to that and he therefore did 
not make such a recommendation. 
The Defendant is entitled to faithful performance on 
the part of the prosecutor with regard to the conditions of the 
plea bargain. The very concept of the bargain was that the 
Plaintiff would limit the number of charges against the Defendant 
and would recommend that the Defendant be submitted for a ninety-
day evaluation. 
The prosecutor failed to keep his end of the bargain. 
He limited the charges, but he did not make the recommendation 
for a ninety-day evaluation of the Defendant. Thereafter, the 
Defendant was sentenced to two terms of one to fifteen years and 
zero to five years. 
The Defendant is entitled to have the prosecution 
follow through in his performance of the plea bargain. The judge 
is not obligated to abide by it, but the prosecution must follow 
through and that did not happen. 
The failure of the prosecution to make the 
recommendation for the ninety-day evaluation may have had an 
influence upon the Court. And indeed, the prosecution cannot say 
now that it did not have an influence, because it's after the 
fact. 
We are entitled to faithful performance of the bargain. 
We want to set aside the guilty plea because of failure in the 
performance. 
Defendant's counsel has listened to the tapes of the 
proceedings of the Juvenile and the District Courts on the dates 
referenced above, and has determined that the prosecutor did 
indeed make the statements ascribed to him. We have made a 
motion to obtain a transcription of the tapes for the dates 
mentioned herein, and expect that the transcriptions are 
forthcoming, but we want to make the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea now to preserve our right to make such a motion, so 
that no time runs against the Defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of January, 1995. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA by 
depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States 
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Alan K. Jeppesen 
Deputy County Attorney 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, UT 84074 
on this 27th day of January, 1995. 
Secretary 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III (#2535) 
Attorney at Law 
440 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 466-6311 
95 AUG ! t, P : ; 3 : 5 3 
FILED B;'___ 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 941300149FS 
Hon. John A. Rokich 
The Court having reviewed the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
hereby denies said Motion. 
DATED this/^day of y ^ ^ j / — , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
^J— A 
_ JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
Attorney for 
I CSmiFY THAT TH» « A TW« COJV OF*Ji 
jasnVCT COURT. TOOOfi COUNTY, «TAT1 
